The Nature of Soldierly Trust

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The contemporary operating environment often throws soldiers into situations where they must quickly establish working relationships with complete strangers: soldiers from other tactical units, law enforcement personnel from federal agencies, and relief coordinators from nongovernment organizations. How is trust established quickly among those myriad groups? The author takes a close look and discovers what it takes to develop swift soldierly trust.

MANY HAVE MARVELED at the military's successes since the Vietnam war debacle eroded Americans' trust in their government and in the U.S. Army. Performance in Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans did much to restore public trust in the Army as a competent, reliable, and ethical institution. When the sexual harassment and rape incidents at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, and the racially motivated hate crimes at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, again threatened to erode the public's trust in the Army, the Army countered with competent, reliable, and ethical actions. Today, the U.S. Army enjoys a remarkably high and consistent level of public trust.[1]

Obversely, soldiers have fluctuated in the amount of trust they invest in civilian citizenry, elected politicians, and senior military leaders.[2] A social chasm, often called the "civil-military gap," has arisen from the public's unfamiliarity with and disassociation from the military caused by the general public's lack of contact with the military since the end of conscription. Politicians are also increasingly unlikely to have served in the Armed Forces; thus, they have difficulty relating to military culture and the soldier's working life. Senior military leaders appear to succumb too easily to their political masters and budget appropriators' whims, and there is a growing generation gap between junior officers and senior officers. These factors contribute to professional soldiers' trust of those who might direct them into harm's way.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently investigated trust within the Army's officer ranks. The study revealed that junior and midcareer officers mistrusted senior officers.[3] Another contemporary study linked the issue of lack of trust to a gap between Baby Boomer and Generation X (Xer) officers.[4] Xers "waited for the 'quality time' with their parents that seldom came and learned to trust only themselves. To the 'Xer,' authority was to be earned, not declared by position or fiat."[5] Xer officers tend not to predicate trust in the Army on guarantees of lifelong careers or rank as do Boomer officers. So, trust among Army officers is more and more a function of generational values. Clearly, soldiers' trust in the institutional Army and in American political institutions is a serious and complex issue for the Army professional.[6]

In this post-Cold War era of complex peace operations, the Army finds itself working with an array of government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Remarking on the competencies of government agencies and NGOs, more than one Army officer in Bosnia has said something to the effect: "Those guys couldn't coordinate anything

Constructs cannot formally address all possible trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviors, given the endless possibilities of human interaction. Individual ethical behavior is really the same as individual trustworthy behavior. This might be why establishing a formal organizational code of ethics tends not to work.

past the squad level, while we're left holding the bag—trying to coordinate an entire nation-building effort." Trusting other agencies in the pursuit of common objectives is certainly not a strength of Army culture.

Trust among peers has been a traditional value of the Army profession. The adage of "trusting your buddy to protect your flank" applies to many Army activities outside combat. However, this dynamic is changing with the advent of complex, dispersed, or noncontiguous operations and with the growing use of ad hoc teams formed on the ground as military operations unfold. Where formerly a soldier relied on a buddy to protect his flank, today the adage might be "trusting a stranger to protect your three-sixty" because of the growing likelihood of never having met the fellow soldier, sailor, marine, airman, or even civilian who now controls that soldier's destiny. In today's contemporary operating environment, initial or swift trust of unfamiliar others is an important professional issue.

Finally, the Army not only continues to sustain trust with its traditional allies, as part of its mission to conduct military engagement, the Army also tries to build trust with newly democratic nations and even not-so-friendly competitors.[7] The goal of these trust-building activities is to "promote democracy and human rights abroad."[8] The Army builds trust with foreign militaries through military-to-military contacts, exchange education, equipment sales, and international training exercises. These missions of trust-building have military significance because future adversaries will likely attack the trust among coalition allies as a critical vulnerability and perhaps as the center of gravity.[9] Building and sustaining international trust as an operational mission is of growing interest to the Army professional.

Unfortunately, the Army offers little doctrine or professional literature on how to address the requirements for trust within and between organizations. Army professionals are left largely to their own experience and learning. To avoid erecting barriers to swift trust among individuals, teams, agencies, organizations, and institutions unfamiliar with one another, the Army professional must know and understand three aspects of trust: the dimensions of trust, the value of trust, and trustworthiness.

The Dimensions of Trust

Social scientists have found the concept of trust too complex to be able to develop a universal definition.[10] Consequently, one must define trust contextually, meaning as it manifests itself in specific issues or in social relationships. Furthermore, definitions of trust are based on common dimensions. The dimensions of trust that I will consider are vulnerability, institutions, and time.

Vulnerability. Vulnerability is the social uncertainty associated with strangers, environments, or situations. This uncertainty is investigated as potential-to-harm risks. Vulnerability in trust relationships between parties is contingent on emotional aspects (fear and feelings of confidence or bonding), cognitive aspects (preconscious expectations or predisposition to trust associated with lifelong learning), or behavioral aspects (observable histories of reliability or of violations).

Vulnerability might vary in form, depth, or risk. In their model of the grammars of trust, Blair H. Sheppard and Dana M. Sherman suggest this matrix: shallow dependence (risks of unreliability and indiscretion); shallow interdependence (risks of poor coordination); deep dependence (risks of cheating, neglect, abuse, and self-esteem; and deep interdependence (risk of misinterpretation of the other's needs).[11] In general, the deeper the dependence or interdependence, the stronger the trust relationship needs to be. The more trust in the relationship, the less vulnerable one will be.

Gareth R. Jones and Jennifer M. George present three levels of trust that address this paradoxical strength-of-trust relationship: conditional trust, unconditional trust, and distrust.[12] Conditional trust is a state in which both parties are willing to transact with each other, as long as each behaves appropriately, sees the situation the same, and can exchange roles.[13] On the other hand, unconditional trust "characterizes an experience of trust that starts when individuals abandon the 'pretense' of suspending belief . . . because shared values now structure the situation."[14] Distrust is a state that results from the dissolution of the trust process, usually through betrayal. An interesting dichotomy arises from a connection between these proposed levels of trust and the vulnerability aspects described earlier. In short, in the trustor-trustee relationship, the deeper the vulnerability, the more desirable is unconditional trust.

Institutions. Institutions provide another dimension through which trust is defined. The institutional dimension of trust includes the habitual rules, struc-

tures, and reputation-building aspects that establish conditions for trust within an institution. Trust relationships within and among institutions depend on leadership or management, professionalism, organizational design, technology, and time.

Leadership and management play a key role in initiating or setting conditions for institutional trust.[15] Setting conditions for trust include building competence (the extent to which members see the institution as effective), openness (seeing others as approachable and honest), concern (a climate of sincerity and caring), reliability (behavioral consistency and congruity), and identification (perception of fairness in how the paradox of individual interests versus group interests are managed).[16]

Professionalism, another key ingredient to building trust in organizations and institutions, normally implies a shared ethos and is a function of expertise or specialized knowledge and skill, responsibility, performance in a social context, and esprit de corps, which derives from a sense of unity and from consciousness of being set apart from laymen.[17] Professionals would rather change an untrustworthy organization or even exit it rather than participate in it. In that regard, professionals are the theoretical antithesis of bureaucrats, who are characterized by loyalty and blind obedience, regardless of the professional climate or culture of trust.[18] Robert Bruce Shaw suggests professional conditions are built by achieving results (following through on commitments), acting with integrity (consistent behavior), and demonstrating concern (respecting the well-being of others).[19] Professionally based trust, then, is the essence of social capital—the accumulated collective trust of the institution gained through engagement and reciprocity.[20]

SFC Thomas R. Roberts, National Guard Bureau

A National Guardman working with members of the New York Police and Fire Departments at the World Trade Center.

Crises often demand the establishment of swift trust relationships among individuals, teams, agencies, organizations, or institutions that are strangers to one another. For example, when state and local disaster-relief activities are organized on the fly, responders must often work together for the first time. Swift trust is built on a number of variables, including reputation, conversation, health, safety, investments, hierarchical position, perceptions of adaptability, cognitive illusion of mastery, presumption of trustworthiness, prospect of future interaction, and role clarity.

A third ingredient in building trust in organizations and institutions is organizational design. Organizational designs are diverse and can include an owner-managed clan; an entrepreneurial adhocracy; a divisionalized hierarchy (typical of U.S. Army organizations); cross-functional or matrixed teams; or a postmodern network.[21] Often, formal controls or constraints are used to build trust in owner-managed or divisionalized bureaucracies. These formal mechanisms are often counterproductive and inefficient, however.

Organizational design refers not only to an organization's internal design but also to its external design, or how it fits with and builds trust with other agencies or organizations. Organizations sometimes combine to form networks, such as strategically allied organizations. These networks often use legalistic measures such as formal contracts to build trust, but these, too, are usually inadequate. Trust becomes the only way to conduct affairs effectively. In these more loosely coupled designs, the most important antecedents for trust are top leader involvement; harmony or equality among partners; and security by reducing uncertainty.[22] Trust in the postmodern network organization is the conceptual converse

of formal rules and becomes the effective way to conduct affairs.

Technology is a fourth part of the institutional dimension of trust.[23] Technology becomes a substitute for trust.[24] Technical control obviates the need for the more uncertain trust. For example, an organization might introduce robotics, automation, or rule-based technology to monitor production quality. Such technology takes quality control from people and gives it to machines. Technology becomes the arbiter of quality. At the end of the day, however, humans will still regulate the machines and technical processes to some degree; hence, trust will continue to be an important component of the institution.



Figure 1. The Author's Multidimensional Model of Trust

The last ingredient in forming trust relationships in institutions is time, specifically, the amount of time available to form trust relationships. The robustness of the initial formation of trust depends on the predisposition of the trustee or trustor. This predisposition rests on things such as a trusting stance (the personal belief that things will turn out satisfactorily regardless of others' trustworthiness), faith in humanity (the personal belief that strangers are trustworthy in ambiguous and novel situations), categorization (how parties stereotype or perceive in-group or out-group identity), structural assurance (how the situation is bounded by legal safeguards, institutional rules, and regulations), and situational normalcy (how familiar parties are in a given context).[25]

Time. During a crisis, there is little time to form trust relationships. Crises often demand the establishment of swift trust relationships among individuals, teams, agencies, organizations, or institutions that are strangers to one another.[26] For example, when state and local disaster-relief activities are organized on the fly, responders must often work together for the first time. Swift trust is built on a number of variables, including reputation, conversation, health, safety, investments, hierarchical position, perceptions of adaptability, cognitive illusion of mastery, presumption of trustworthiness, prospect of future interaction, and role clarity.[27] Time, as a dimension of trust, increases in importance as vulnerability increases. Professional institutions use slow activity periods to develop methods to increase the chances for forming swift initial trust relationships when a crisis hits.

Forming and sustaining institutionally based trust involves setting conditions through leadership and management, promoting professionalism, designing organizations, recognizing the social aspects of technical systems, and making the most of precrisis time to lay the groundwork for trust relationships. Institutionally based trust cuts both ways: from within (how members perceive trust) and without (reflected in the abundance or scarcity of "social capital"—how all parties will trust the institution). Figure 1 depicts a synthesized model of the dimensions of trust. Understanding trust requires interpreting these dimensions within and among individuals and organizations.

The Value of Trust

Not only must Army professionals know and understand the dimensions of trust, they must also know and understand the value of trust. There are several ways to measure the value of trust. One is to measure trust's intangible (or soft-side) benefits. The other is to measure trust's tangible (or hard-side) benefits. However, both must be considered together when assessing the value of trust.

Currently, social scientists discuss trust's tangible value to personal or organizational relationships using an economic metaphor. For example, trust is social capital. Another metaphor is the cost-transaction of trust. A third example characterizes managerial or leadership controls devised and implemented to enforce trust as direct or indirect expenditures (or sunk costs) of trust establishment. Rule-based technology, such as the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), epitomizes this kind of managerial control. Yet, the most interesting phenomenon about the economic metaphor of trust is that the metaphor loses some of its explanatory power in one key aspect: through use, trust grows, not diminishes.

When used in lieu of managerial control to influence organizational behavior, trust has many benefits. Trust permits self-regulation, a cornerstone of knowl-

edge-based and team-based postmodern management theory. Trust contributes not only to efficiency but also to effectiveness. One study found that trust accounts for one-quarter of the impact on all factors associated with organizational effectiveness.[28] Trust has obvious strong economic value.

When considering trust's intangible benefits to an organization, one finds that trust enables positive organizational benefits that are economically immeasurable. Trust enables organizational members more freedom of action, innovation can blossom, and it encourages professionalism so ethical values and trustworthy behavior can expand. Increased organizational trust also yields more organizational strategic integration when pursuing superordinate goals.[29] With growing workplace diversity in gender, ethnicity, race, and nationality, a healthy presence of trust contrasts sharply with betrayals of trust.

Betrayals of trust might be categorized as contract-type violations, communication-type violations, or competence-type violations. Contract-type violations are those that harm expectations, boundaries, consistency, and so forth. Communication-type violations debilitate members' willingness to share information, to tell the truth, to maintain confidentiality, to give feedback, or to speak with purpose. Competence-type violations include disrespecting others' knowledge, skills, abilities, and judgment.[30] Betrayals of trust are manifested by discrimination, indiscretion, unreliability, cheating, abuse, neglect, self-esteem, poor coordination, and unanticipated situations.[31]

Betrayals can tear an organization apart, and rebuilding or healing betrayals of trust use up significant organizational resources, especially time. Not only is there an immediate real and concrete cost to betrayals of trust, but usually, there also are hidden costs associated with second- and third-order effects of betrayal. Furthermore, failure to address the intangible aspects of trust can be devastatingly expensive.

Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness simply means being worthy of trust. There are no easy paths for leaders or managers to be worthy of trust. Some observers are rather prescriptive. For example, Shaw argues that trustworthiness should be built through—

- Living by genuinely shared values and operating principles.
- Sharing a common vision or view of the world.
- Enhancing familiarity across groups.
- Encouraging experience with risk-taking and experimentation.
- Making signs of trust and collaboration visible.[32]

While there is much to commend in the list above, some items might not translate easily into action. Nevertheless, trustworthiness has three subsets: building trust, sustaining trust, and rebuilding trust. Furthermore, trust-building seems to rest on three foundational cornerstones: ethics, culture, and organization development (OD).

Ethics. Ethics and individual trustworthiness are actually parallel, if not synonymous, concepts. In the academic community, social scientists build constructs to discuss and test ethics and individual trustworthiness separately, usually along the lines of "schools in the academe." These constructs usually describe what unethical behavior is, establish norms to restrict such behavior, and then articulate formal ethical standards or policies in some sort of code.[33]

Unfortunately, these constructs cannot formally address all possible trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviors, given the endless possibilities of human interaction. Individual ethical behavior is really the same as individual trustworthy behavior. This

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Professionalism, another key ingredient to building trust in organizations and institutions, normally implies a shared ethos and is a function of expertise or specialized knowledge and skill, responsibility, performance in a social context, and esprit de corps, which derives from a sense of unity and from consciousness of being set apart from laymen.



Figure 2. Integrating Trust and Distrust: Alternative Social Realities.

From Roy J. Lewicki, Daniel J. McAllister, and Robert J. Bies, "Trust and Distrust: New Ralationships and Realities, " *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 445.

might be why establishing a formal organizational code of ethics tends not to work.[34]

Given this reality, the task then becomes determining how to enhance or encourage informal means (group norms and values) to encourage trustworthiness. These informal means are preferred to managerial or leadership controls in handling specific situational aspects of trustee-trustor relationships. Identifying and reinforcing the desirable informal norms and values set boundaries for trustworthy behavior and underwrite the art of leadership and management.

Culture. Shaw's recommendations for sharing values and vision, building familiarity, encouraging risk-taking, and collaborating reflect the cultural nature of trust in organizations. Unfortunately, little quantitative evidence exists to support the conclusion that management's attempts to shape an organizational culture of trust result in better organizational effectiveness.[35]

Even so, human-relations theorists have been espousing for five decades the need to build trust through employee empowerment.[36] For example, Kurt Lewin's concept of quasi-stationary equilibrium is a classic, empirically based theory of how the process of changing social habits and group standards can build organizational trust. The process involves unfreezing these undesirable habits and standards, usually through some catharsis that causes an emotional stir up, teaching new ones, and then refreezing these as the desirable state. Lewin's process is based on empowering work groups to provide the necessary positive pressures—Lewin uses the metaphor of a force field—that achieve the desired attitudes and behaviors. Lewin emphasizes that all groups and organizations are different. Therefore, managers must diagnose each situation before intervening.[37]

Organization development. One promising way to achieve trustworthiness is found in the OD field. OD is a management and leadership philosophy that recognizes Lewin's notions of the uniqueness of each situation. The OD approach suggests that managers first assess competing group values and norms and leadership values and norms present in the organizational culture. Managers should then use the assessments to build collaborative strategies to improve values and norms.[38]

A contemporary twist on Lewin's theory and OD philosophy presents enforced self-regulation as the mechanism to use to achieve an ideal organizational state of trustworthiness.[39] Self-regulated or self-managed relationships rely on strong informal group pressures to enforce trustworthy behavior. Formal management-regulated norms and values become important substitutes only when informal ones do not achieve self-regulating trustworthiness. Formal structure and rules applied prudently might set conditions or might facilitate the eventual building, sustaining, or rebuilding of informal means (group norms and values).

According to the enforced self-regulation approach, the ultimate management and leadership strategic objective is to build informal, self-regulated trustworthiness in an organization. Under this rubric, the ideal culture of trustworthiness emerges without recourse to management and leadership inter-



The author proposes an assessment-based view (ABV) of trust based on the integrative model described in Figure 2. Instead of a cause-effect view of trust, the pattern associated with trust in each situation provides more insight to the manager or leader in what to do, if anything, about the trust situation.

vention. Thus, some postmodern management theorists have predicted the end of management as the outcome of building a self-managed organization of the future.[40] The ideal way to trustworthiness is through democratic reform in the workplace, that is, through full employee empowerment.[41]

Even after 50 years of compelling recommendations by organizational researchers, managers and leaders do not cultivate informal group pressures to increase trustworthiness in their organizations. Instead, they usually focus on the comparatively softer aspects of workgroup roles and norms. Furthermore, implementing wholesale democratization in the workplace ignores the complexity of the trustworthiness issue. After all, it only takes a couple of bad apple employees or crass managers to ruin such an ideal state. While democratic principles are admirable in the workplace, management and leadership would then become largely matters of employing political resources to manage conflict.[42]

Full-scale workplace democratization would acerbate office politics and might lead to power-fragmenting arrangements of factions, coalitions, interest groups, and the inevitable tyrannical majority. Today's managers and leaders might not have the competencies required for developing consensus using political resources. Few higher education programs provide practical ways to manage and lead with these democratic power arrangements. Perhaps the unconditional trust that Jones and George emphasize is a bridge too far for today's managers and leaders, especially those working in the U.S. Army.

New Paradigms?

Researchers are developing a new, complex model to examine issues of organizational trust and distrust. The model might prove useful to postmodern organizations in transition, such as the Army.[43] Traditional views place trust and distrust at opposing ends of a continuum: trust is good, while distrust is bad. In contrast, the new model sees trust and distrust coexisting in workplace relationships. Figure 2 depicts the author's postmodern construct of trust. Notice that instead of a linear diagnosis, this integrative model offers what postmodern complexity and chaos theories would refer to as deep patterning; it depicts the trust-distrust relationship as fractal.[44]

Given the future development of reliable, valid assessment tools, profiles of group or organizational trustworthiness might look something like figure 3, which I call the assessment-based view (ABV). The ABV offers a paradoxical approach for analyzing the trustworthiness of relationships ranging from individual to international. ABV has intuitive appeal to the practitioner and helps explain better than existing models why fostering trustworthy individuals and organizations is not simply a matter of linear cause and effect. Human relationships are more complex in the postmodern workplace and in the international arena, and the ABV model portrays the contingent, paradoxical pattern of dynamic trustworthiness found there. ABV might be the most promising way to understand and appreciate the best possible state of trustworthiness in individuals and organizations because ABV judges trust according to each situation.

Trust in organizations is highly complex and paradoxical. Given the soft variables associated with vulnerability, institutions, and time, we can better appreciate the dimensions of trust and gain insight into the value of trustworthiness in the Army. Although there are no magic bullets to develop trustworthiness, managers and leaders can at least better grasp trust's paradoxical nature. The art of management

and leadership must include developing intuitive ways to develop trust because scientific ways are unlikely.

Recommendations to the U.S. Army Professional

To offer specific recommendations, I return to soldier trust and what U.S. Army professionals can do. I will briefly address recommendations for coping with trust in its numerous venues: public trust, institutional trust, cross-organizational trust, swift trust, and cross-national trust. Finally, I will address aspects of trust as an important factor in planning operations.

Public trust. U.S. Army professionals should continue the policy of full disclosure of trust and incidents of betrayal through the news media and directly to the general public; include formal measures of public trust as evidence of the Army's overall organizational effectiveness; and continue to reinforce the Army's unique civil-military relationships enhanced by a large, well-resourced hometown Reserve Component and formal public outreach programs.

Institutional trust. Military leaders should focus on building small teams (squads and sections) as the principal strength of a future self-leading Army and offer tools to small-unit leaders to assess trust in various situations as a critical measure of mission readiness. DOD and the Army have long struggled with finding soft, or human, measures of readiness. Readiness is currently measured with hard data centered on logistics, personnel, and training measures. Perhaps trust assessments would signal a significant change in readiness emphasis. The ABV model looks promising in this regard.

Currently, Army Transformation goals and processes are driven from the top, down. Leaders should instead develop ways to increase participation and creativity from the bottom, up.[45] Leaders need to increase group linkages between ranks and hierarchical power positions by establishing continuous advisory or steering committees that engage all levels. For example, those who serve in self-leading Army teams might offer great insight into the second- and third-order effects of policy at the Department of the Army level.

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should be transformed into a network organization that would provide the field Army a forum for the exchange of ideas to quickly influence doctrine, organization, and Army culture. TRADOC would become an information manager, discussion facilitator, and referee. Such a transformation would involve a new power arrangement that would capitalize on information technology. For example, TRADOC could no longer veto or filter Army lessons learned. The power to change would be dispersed among those who deal with the external environment—the Army's operational units.

The Army should make a radical change in how it uses PPBS. PPBS has demonstrated to Congress and the Services its value as a successful requirements and budgeting accountability tool; yet, its excessive management controls leave leaders little room to exercise discretion, initiative, innovation, or trust-building.

The Army should adopt popular management paradigms, such as total quality management, process reengineering, or balanced scorecard, but without harming institutional trust. We must be careful not to inadvertently displace strong institutional trust with management controls.

Cross-organizational trust. The Army should enhance boundary-spanning opportunities for young officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) early in their careers. The more experience young leaders have with a wide range of agencies and foreign groups, the better. Leaders should find ways to capture individual learning in these situations and to share insights. The goal is to shape leaders to be more tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty.

The Army should continue the trend of training to simulate cross-organizational relationships before soldiers enter real-world operations; ask an increasing number of other agencies to participate in training; and offer other means of exposing U.S. Army professionals to a wide range of agencies. This might involve using group training sessions to expose cultural patterns of trust among participants. Also, the Army should teach the theory of trust in the officer and NCO education systems.

The ABV model of trust looks promising as a tool to assess specific situations of trustworthiness in cross-organizational relationships. The model also offers a common language various organizations can use to discuss trust issues openly.

Swift trust. There is no substitute for professionalization of the soldier. When a professionally competent soldier recognizes another professionally competent soldier, swift trust results, and betrayal becomes rare. As with cross-organizational trust, training with soldier-strangers will teach coping mechanisms for real-world missions that require swift trust.

Cross-national trust. This might be the Army professional's greatest challenge. The value of trust differs tremendously across nations and cultures. Again, the ABV model looks promising in assessing specific situations of trustworthiness in cross-national relationships.

As with building appreciation for cross-organizational trust and swift trust, there is no substitute for training with foreign partners. Multinational training exercises build trust, but the professional soldier must learn that social capital and political capital are different things.[46] The best state of political trust achiev-

able with another nation's military might be the "trust but verify" situation located in the upper right-hand block of the integrated model of trust-distrust in figure 2, while social trust might exist among professional soldiers on a different plane.

Trust as a planning factor. Some military operations are precipitated by crisis. The war with Serbia and current operations in Afghanistan exemplify this type of operation. These quick-reaction situations engender a sense of urgency in which swift trust among strangers becomes essential to mission accomplishment. On the other hand, some military operations are preceded by planning periods based on treaties and agreements. The United States' initial deployments of units to the Sinai, Bosnia, and Kosovo fall into this category, as would follow-on operations as part of a larger campaign already under way. In such operations, combinations of swift and institutional trust are necessary.

Trust is essential to all human interactions. Perhaps trust is most important in interactions that demand trust from complete strangers. Understanding what trust is and how it is built, or conversely, how it is destroyed, should be basic knowledge to every warfighter. Even more important, however, is knowing how to engender trustworthiness—being worthy of trust—among individuals or among organizations so that they can form effective teams and networks that can accomplish the most complex and challenging tasks and on whose success rests the Nation's survival. No other knowledge can be more important to Army professionals. ***MR***

NOTES

1. *See* <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/successful.html>, 18 July 2001. DOD cites public opinion polls of the past 20 years rating the military as the most trusted U.S. institution. *See also* Leslie McAneny, "Military on Top, HMOs Last in Public Confidence Poll," *Gallup News Service*, 14 July 1999, at <www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990714.asp>, 18 July 2001.
2. *See* Don Snider, John Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, "Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century," at <www.accts.org/ethics/snidert.htm>, 18 July 2001.
3. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000).
4. Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000), at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/>, 19 July 2001.
5. Ibid., 8.
6. The entire Summer 2001 *Parameters* is devoted to these and other social issues plaguing the military. See *Parameters* 31, no. 2 (Summer 2001), at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01summer/contents.htm>, 18 July 2001.
7. For example, *see* Sherri Wasserman Goodman, "The Environment and National Security," remarks by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security, National Defense University, 8 August 1996, at <https://denix.cecer.army.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Speeches/speech-22.html>, 18 July 2001.
8. *The National Military Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: White House, December 1999), iii.
9. *See* Robert H. Scales, "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions," *Parameters* 28, no. 4 (1998): 4-10.
10. *See* Gregory A. Bigley and Jone L. Pearce, "Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: Problems of Trust and Mistrust," *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (1998): 405-21.
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13. Ibid., 536.
14. Ibid.
15. Ellen M. Whitener, Susan E. Brodt, M. Audrey Korsgaard, and Jon M. Werner, "Managers and Initiators of Trust: An Exchange Relationship Framework for Understanding Managerial Trustworthy Behavior," *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (1998): 513-30.
16. Pamela Shockley-Zalabak, Kathleen Ellis, and Gaynelle Winograd, "Organizational Trust: What it Means, Why it Matters," *Organization Development Journal* 18, no. 4 (2000): 35-48.
17. These are the criteria that Samuel P. Huntington associates with the military professional. *See* Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957).
18. For example, *see* Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, September 1972).
19. Robert Bruce Shaw, *Trust in the Balance: Building Successful Organizations on Results, Integrity, and Concern* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, March 1997).
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22. Thierry Volery and Stan Mensik, "The Role of Trust in Creating Effective Alliances: A Managerial Perspective," *Journal of Business Ethics* 17 (1998): 987-94.
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28. Shockley-Zalabak et al., 42.
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32. Shaw, 140.
33. Andrew Brien, "Professional Ethics and the Culture of Trust," *Journal of Business Ethics* 17 (1998): 391-409.
34. Ibid., 392.
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46. *See* Kenneth Newton, "Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy," *International Political Science Review* 22, no. 2 (2001): 201-14.

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